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
**IMPLEMENTATION OF KILLIAN REPORT**

**NSC Action 1430**

**"Examination of Peripheral War Problem: With respect to General Recommendation 11:**

**(1) Noted that the proposal for a study of techniques and weapons technology for peripheral wars is being implemented through a study by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and through a study under a CIA contract."**

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**Implementation of Killian Report:**

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**1 August 1956**

**Specific Recommendation C. 4**

**"We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent some new technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a National Intelligence Estimate, with adequate safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our most useful techniques of intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to which an enemy might be manipulating the information obtained through these sources."**

**Status: The Intelligence Advisory Committee initiated a special National Intelligence Estimate to meet this recommendation. Completion is expected in September 1956. Work is being coordinated through the IAC.**

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Implementation of Killian Report

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1 August 1956

Specific Recommendation C. 9:

"The growing principles and technology of information retrieval will advance and may revolutionize the handling of large masses of intelligence data. Their application should be sought out more actively."

Status: Active search for new equipment and techniques for the handling of large masses of intelligence data has been a pre-occupation of CIA since its establishment. In May 1955 the IAC established a sub-committee to "coordinate the development and implementation of compatible systems of documentation and processing of information within the intelligence community." In addition to regular IAC members, NSA and USIA are also represented. A working group on equipment research composed of specialists in research and development has been established to insure that all agencies of the intelligence community are made aware of new equipment which may be of value and that the possibilities of each new technical advance are thoroughly explored on behalf of the community.

Efforts at the moment are being concentrated on Eastman Kodak minicard equipment. Both the Air Force and CIA expect to install minicard equipment as soon as it becomes available.

On behalf of the members of the agencies represented on the committee, CIA has entered into a contract with [REDACTED] in order to be kept currently informed of the latest developments in the field of information programs.

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
**Implementation of Killian Report**

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**1 August 1956**

**General Recommendation 6, and**  
**Specific Recommendation C. 7:**

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**Status:** After extensive examination of this problem CIA has rejected the conclusion that the implementation of these recommendations is principally an overt activity involving extensive logistical preparations and, therefore, more in keeping with the responsibilities and activities with the Department of Defense. A letter has been prepared to the Department of Defense requesting that they take the responsibility for pursuing these recommendations.

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
1 August 1956

Specific Recommendation C, 3:

"We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross over-estimation or gross underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology."

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
Implementation of Killian Report

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1 August 1956

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Specific Recommendation C. 3 continued:



**c. Research and Development Projects**

As means of acquiring "hard facts," various scientific and technical methods are currently under study or development in the Services and within the Agency. The more promising of these are listed below:

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**1 August 1956**

**Specific Recommendation C.3, continued:**

**(1) Aerial Reconnaissance**

The Navy Department has under study the use of high altitude photography from rockets fired vertically on the Soviet periphery. The Air Force will, within a year, have in limited production the RB-57, a medium high altitude reconnaissance plane, based on the British Special Canberra. Air Force also has received a proposal for a true high altitude special reconnaissance plane -- the Lockheed CL 325 -- embodying the hydrogen burning REX III engine for availability in 4-5 years. The Air Force has under study the development of an Advanced Reconnaissance System, employing an earth satellite vehicle using either photographic or television techniques.

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1 August 1956

**Specific Recommendation C. 3, continued:**

**(6) Data Handling Systems**

Under CIA leadership, considerable progress has been made by most intelligence agencies in machine methods for the cataloguing and storage of information. This is based on the Eastman Kodak Minicard system and the CIA intelligence subject index. However, comparable work is not at present going forward on the problem of search for and recovery of data once stored. There are also a number of research projects underway to improve the data reduction of ELINT primary take and to provide some mechanization of photo interpretation.

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1 August 1956

**Specific Recommendation A. 9:**

**"As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States and the USSR in a possible nuclear air war, a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and USSR Bravo, Romeo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common frame-work of analysis."**

**Status: Principal responsibility in this recommendation rests with the Department of Defense. In support thereof CIA has continued to distribute its commodity and sector analyses of the Sino-Soviet Bloc economies to the Air Force for incorporation in whatever models AFOIN or its contractors develop.**

**NSC 5605, approved 24 May 1956, established procedures for providing integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR in the event of general war. More specifically, it states that while a general estimate should be made of the over-all effects of the U.S. attacks against the USSR, it is not expected or anticipated that detailed analyses will be undertaken. This directive supersedes NSC 5511 as guidance for these evaluations and apparently cancels the need for the kind of detailed data which would be provided by symmetric analysis.**

**The broad effectiveness of present nuclear weapons systems has appeared to make obsolete the construction of elaborate and detailed analyses of potentially hostile economies for purposes of post-attack damage assessment. Sufficiently accurate answers can be supplied far more easily by less elaborate means.**

**For these reasons, CIA proposes to take no further action.**

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**1 August 1956**

**Specific Recommendation C.6**

**"There are generally recognized technical and administrative problems in the field of ELINT (electronic noise listening). This situation urgently needs attention. A combination of technical knowledge and adequate authority at a high level is required."**

**Status: On 16 May 1955 the NSC noted the issuance of NSCID-17 which was approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee for improvement of ELINT analysis. The National Technical Processing Center is now being activated with the full cooperation of CIA. It appears that ELINT cooperation and coordination will be effectively carried out.**

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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REMARKS:

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL